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Russians began to obtain a first-hand knowledge of Japan in the mid-eighteenth century, 
though there had already been indirect contacts for well over a hundred years.
1
  The first 
Japanese to visit Russia appears to have done so at the very end of the sixteenth century:  this 
was a Japanese Christian known as Nicolaus de St Augustino who accompanied the 
Portuguese Augustinian priest Nicloaus de Melo on a journey from the Philippines charged 
with a secret diplomatic mission to promote Catholic interests against Constantinople.  
Passing through Russia en route to Rome, the pair were arrested on suspicion of espionage 
and confined for several years in a series of monasteries.
2
  The seventeenth-century historical 
record contains several Russian treatments of Japan and the Japanese,
3
 but more regular 
contacts began only towards the end of this century, as a consequence of Russian exploration 
in eastern Siberia and Kamchatka.
4
  In 1697 the explorer Vladimir Atlasov encountered a 
shipwrecked Japanese merchant, Denbei, who had been held captive in Kamchatka by the 
local inhabitants.  Denbei was conveyed to Moscow, where he was interviewed by Peter the 
Great in 1702 and ordered to learn Russian so that he could later teach Japanese to Russian 




These early contacts between Japan and Russia took place outside the geographical 
boundaries of Japan, and indeed by the middle of the seventeenth century the Japanese had 
deliberately all but cut themselves off from any relations with European powers.  In the mid-
sixteenth century, partly inspired by Marco Polo’s report on the ‘measureless quantities’ of 
gold which were supposedly to be found in Japan,
6
 first the Portuguese, then the Spanish and 
 2 
other western European nations, pursuing their commercial and missionary interests in the 
East Indies, had established both trading and cultural relations with the Japanese.  
Christianity, and most especially Catholicism under the energetic leadership of Francis 
Xavier, found fertile ground, so that at the height of early European influence there were 
some 500,000 Japanese Christians. However, as the Tokugawa government strove to assert its 
authority over regional centres in the first decades of the seventeenth century, it came to see 
Christian influence as a threat to its own hegemony.  Accordingly, a series of anti-Christian 
and anti-European measures were introduced which severely curtailed Japanese contacts with 
the West.  Gradually the European powers withdrew: the British voluntarily in 1624, the 
Spanish and Portuguese under duress in 1636 and 1638 respectively.  The remaining Japanese 
Christians became the victims of persecution.  After 1638 European ships approaching 
Japanese shores were turned back or destroyed and their crews risked execution; Japanese 
subjects were forbidden to travel abroad or to return when once they had left Japan.  Only the 
Dutch, their protestant religion being considered less dangerous than the militant Catholicism 
of the Iberian powers, were allowed to remain.  Even so their freedom of action was greatly 
restricted.  They were permitted to engage in trade only through the single port of Nagasaki, 
where they were confined to the tiny artificial island of Deshima.  Annual formalised visits to 
the Shogun’s court in Edo (Tokyo) were the only opportunity the Dutch were given to form 
any more detailed impression of Japan.
7
 
 As a result of the Tokugawa ‘seclusion policy’, for the next two hundred years contact 
between Japan and the countries of Europe was thus extremely limited.  In Japan information 
about the outside world was largely confined to what could be learned through the Dutch and 
from Japan’s closest Asian neighbours, the Chinese, the Koreans and the inhabitants of the 
Ryukyu Islands.  In Europe knowledge about Japan was equally sketchy and limited to a 
handful of reports written by travellers in the employ of the Dutch and to encounters with 
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small numbers of shipwrecked Japanese sailors.  The situation only began to change in the 
middle of the nineteenth century following the more or less forcible opening of Japan to 
commerce by the Americans.  
 Nevertheless, from the eighteenth century onwards, ships of other nations did 
increasingly approach Japanese shores, some by accident, seeking refuge from storms in the 
north Pacific, some by design.  In 1797, for example, a United States ship was used by the 
Dutch to transport goods from Batavia to Deshima.  In 1808, following the British occupation 
of the Dutch East Indies during the Napoleonic Wars, H.M.S. Phaeton entered Nagasaki 
harbour in pursuit of Dutch shipping.  In 1813-14 Stamford Raffles led an unsuccessful 
commercial expedition to Japan.  Later in the nineteenth century the expanding volume of 
whalers and other shipping in the north Pacific led to further and more determined approaches 
by western powers, until following pressure particularly by the American Matthew Perry in 




 The Russian contribution to the process of  ‘opening up’ Japan was not 
inconsiderable.  The first Russians to set foot on Japanese soil did so as an offshoot of the 
Second Bering Expedition led by Martin Spanberg and William Walton, in 1739, though 
because of inconsistencies in their reports and the inaccuracy of the navigational methods 
available at that time, it was not clear until many years later that they had done so.  For the 
next fifty years, however, Russian activity in the region was largely confined to the Kurile 
Islands, which were a relatively new area of influence for the Japanese.  Japan proper was 
briefly visited in 1771 by a group of political exiles from Kamchatka in a stolen Russian ship 
under the leadership of the flamboyant adventurer Count Benyovszky;  and in 1778 an 
unsuccessful attempt was made to open trade with the Japanese commercial ventures in 
Hokkaido.    
 4 
The first official Russian mission to Japan took place in 1792, when Adam Laxman 
travelled to Hokkaido to return a group of Japanese castaways and to attempt to open up 
commercial relations.  Laxman was received courteously, but told that in order to discuss 
trade he should proceed to Nagasaki.  He was issued with an official certificate allowing a 
Russian ship to enter that port, the exact significance of which has been much debated, but 
which was interpreted by the Russians to imply that trade would be allowed.
9
   
 This article discusses the narratives left behind by members of three subsequent 
expeditions all preceding the ‘opening up’ of Japan.  The first is the record of Adam 
Krusenstern, captain of the ship which eventually conveyed ambassador Nikolai Rezanov to 
Nagasaki in 1804 to take advantage of the permit granted to Laxman.
10
  The second is the 
account of Vasilii Golovnin, who in 1811, while attempting to survey the southern Kurile 
Islands, was taken captive by the Japanese together with two of his fellow officers and four 
sailors, and held prisoner on Hokkaido for over two years.
11
  The third is the Japanese section 
of the novelist Ivan Goncharov's rather better known narrative, Fregat Pallada (The Frigate 
Pallada).  This describes the embassy of Admiral Evfimii Putiatin to Nagasaki in 1853 which, 
although Goncharov left the expedition before the accomplishment of Putiatin's goal, finally 
led to the signing of a treaty of friendship and trade between Russia and Japan.
12
  These 
principal sources are not the only existing first-hand accounts of the three voyages, but they 
have been selected as the most detailed, best known and thus most influential of the 
narratives available.  Other texts, such as Georg Heinrich von Langsdorff’s  memoir of the 




 Recent writing on nineteenth-century European travel writing, and most notably Mary 
Louise Pratt’s book, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, has suggested that 
very often accounts of non-European parts of the world contain within them an identifiably 
 5 
colonialist discourse in which narrative exploration of the foreign other is inextricably linked 
with a desire to appropriate that other both ideologically and economically.  Given that the 
Russian texts under discussion here are the records of official government expeditions aimed 
directly or indirectly at initiating trade between Russia and its largely unknown Asian 
neighbour, they can usefully be examined in a similar light.  Specifically, Pratt identifies two 
concepts which facilitate this type of analysis and which are readily applicable to the Russian 
texts.  These are ‘contact zone’, ‘the space in which peoples geographically and historically 
separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually 
involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict’,
14
 and ‘anti-
conquest’, ‘the strategies of representation whereby European bourgeois subjects seek to 
secure their innocence in the same moment as they assert European hegemony’.
15
  The 
Russian texts, as will be seen, cannot be viewed entirely through the lens of these 
perspectives, but they do provide a productive interpretive starting point for their analysis.
16
 
Looking at the Russian narratives it is immediately apparent that the ‘contact zone’ 
between the European subject and the Asian focus of observation is extremely narrow.  This 
is true in a double sense: Russian prior knowledge of Japan at the time of the expeditions was 
extremely limited, and moreover the degree to which the members of the expeditions were 
able to form a coherent view of Japanese society was also very severely restricted.  On the 
first point Krusenstern notes particularly that at the time of his voyage only two at all recently 
published works on Japan existed in European languages, treatises by Engelbert Kaempfer, 
whose sojourn in Japan had taken place between 1690 and 1692, over a hundred years before 
Krusenstern, and by Carl Thunberg, whose experience dated to 1775, some thirty years 
before.  Kaempfer’s book in particular, following its first, posthumous, publication in 1727, 
proved enormously popular and exercised a very considerable influence over European 
writing on Japan for the next two hundred years.
17
  Kaempfer and Thunberg were both 
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doctors, German and Swedish respectively, in the service of the Dutch.  The Dutch 
themselves, in order to protect their commercial monopoly, had not, as Krusenstern notes 
with some distaste, made any of the knowledge they had gained publicly available, even to 
the extent of producing a reliable map of the approaches to Nagasaki.
18
  In addition to 
Kaempfer and Thunberg, Langsdorff, while equally bemoaning the paucity of up-to-date 
material on Japan, also notes the availability of work by Pierre-François-Xavier Charlevoix, 
presumably compiled on the basis of earlier Jesuit sources.
19
 
Golovnin had at least the additional benefit of Krusenstern's account of his 
experiences, though he notes with some regret that at the time of his capture he had not read 
the second part of this work.
20
  This might indeed have been of particular interest to him as it 
records Krusenstern’s encounters with Japanese and Ainu in Hokkaido on his return trip to 
Russia from Nagasaki.   Goncharov, writing some forty years later, had a slightly richer store 
of information to draw on as Golovnin left not only the story of his captivity, but also a 
volume of observations on the country and its people compiled on the basis of conversations 
with his interpreters and guards.  Moreover, another German scholar working with the Dutch, 
Philip Franz von Siebold, in 1832 published his description of Japan based on his residence at 
Nagasaki between 1823 and 1830.
21
  Siebold drew a large part of his information from the 
Japanese who attended the school he was allowed to run between 1824 and 1828 to promote 
Western learning, particularly medicine.
22
  Goncharov may also have been familiar with the 
memoir of Isaac Titsingh, head of the Dutch merchants from 1780 to 1794, whose account of 
his experiences in Japan was published posthumously in English and French in the early 
1820s.
23
  Even with these expanded resources, however, particularly since their authors rarely 
penetrated beyond official Japan, and Golovnin’s personal experiences were confined to 
Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands, Russian knowledge of the country at the time of the Putiatin 
expedition was far from either comprehensive or up to date.  Russian ignorance is illustrated 
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by Goncharov even as Putiatin’s ships enter Nagasaki harbour.  The Russians saw small 
model sailing boats on the water decorated with multicoloured pennants, but were quite 
unable to determine their significance.  Goncharov reports that according to his companions 
the boats were associated variously with religious rites, superstitious customs, divination, or 
simply children’s play.
24
  Japanese knowledge of the Russians, of course, was no more 
advanced.  When Rezanov and his companions called at Northern Hokkaido on their return 
trip to Russia the Japanese they met there refused at first to believe that they were indeed 
Russians as their hair was not dressed in the queues that had been fashionable at the time of 
Laxman’s visit twenty years before.
25
 
 As far as first hand contact with Japanese people and customs was concerned, 
Krusenstern and Goncharov were almost entirely confined to official receptions and banquets 
and to communication on official matters and details concerning the reprovisioning or repair 
of their ships.  Krusenstern, indeed, explicitly denies being able to give any satisfactory 
account of Japan notwithstanding his six months' residence in Nagasaki harbour.
26
   
Goncharov makes the same point when he notes that his account reads like a prisoner’s diary: 
so little opportunity does he have to interact with the world around him.
27
  None of Putiatin's 
expedition was allowed to stay overnight on land, and although fifty years before ambassador 
Rezanov had been given first a barren piece of land about twice the length of his ship on 
which to exercise and later a house at a place called Megasaki, both of these sites were 
completely closed in by bamboo palisades or water and strongly guarded to prevent any 
casual contact with Japanese citizens.  Even the collection of information from the Dutch at 
Nagasaki was prevented.  On Krusenstern's first arrival he and Rezanov were visited by 
representatives of the Dutch settlement, but after this initial meeting all contacts with the 
Dutch, who were in any case kept virtual prisoners on the island of Deshima, were forbidden 
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by the Japanese.  Krusenstern notes that the Dutch ships, as they left Nagasaki harbour for 
Batavia, were not even permitted to return the Russians’ shouted greetings.
28
 
 Golovnin of course spent considerably longer in Japan than either Krusenstern or 
Goncharov and was able to meet a somewhat larger range of people, indeed to establish quite 
strong personal relationships with some officials, interpreters and guards.  He notes a high 
degree of interest in the Russians from the wider population and records many unexpected 
acts of hospitality.  While being transported, bound, as required by Japanese law, from one 
part of Hokkaido to another, the Russians would, for example,  be entertained by the 
inhabitants of the villages through which they passed and were thus allowed at least glimpses 
of Japanese domestic behaviour.  As it was forbidden by law for the Japanese to receive 
foreigners in the body of their houses, the Russians were accommodated on the verandahs.  
Although a fiction was maintained that they were forced to rest wherever they could because 
of the fatigues of their journey, they generally found that lavish refreshments had been 
prepared in advance.
29
   Golovnin several times notes a similar insistence on the letter of the 
law combined with a willingness to circumvent its harsher implications in practice.  Further 
glimpses of the world outside captivity were vouchsafed to Golovnin and his companions 
when, thinking they would otherwise be detained in Japan indefinitely, the Russians escaped, 
hoping to be able to steal a boat and thus make their way north to Sakhalin or the Russian 
Kurile Islands.  Before their recapture a few days later they were able to see something of the 
Hokkaido countryside and of the fishing villages along the coast near Matsumae, though they 
were naturally not in a position to approach any of their inhabitants.  Apart from this, 
however, their most extensive observations were naturally of the different categories of prison 
in which they were held.   
 A further limitation to the contact zone was produced by the inadequacy of the 
available interpreters, which stands as a metaphor for a more general failure of cultural 
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communication.  Although Dutch was known to be the only European language with which 
the Japanese were acquainted, Rezanov's embassy did not contain anyone who was fully 
conversant with it.
30
  The Russians were forced to rely on the Japanese castaways they had 
brought with them and the Russian these castaways had learned in exile.  The situation with 
regard to written communication was even more problematic.  Rezanov had brought with him 
a document addressed to the Shogun, the Japanese military ruler, written in Russian and 
Japanese.  The Japanese text, which had been produced by a castaway fisherman in Irkutsk, 
proved unintelligible to the Japanese officials and the Russians were obliged laboriously to 
produce a Dutch translation.
31
 Goncharov does not highlight interpretation as presenting any 
difficulty as Putiatin's expedition of 1853 took the precaution of bringing a Dutch speaker in 
the person of Konstantin Pos’et.
32
  Golovnin, on the other hand, who had not expected to 
enter into any form of negotiation or explanation with the Japanese, found himself in some 
embarrassment.  Eventually he was able to teach sufficient Russian to a Japanese volunteer 
and himself learn a certain amount of Japanese.  In the early stages of his imprisonment, 
however, the only way he could communicate with his captors was through two Kurile 
interpreters, one of whom spoke broken Russian and the other broken Japanese.  As neither of 
the Kuriles was at all well educated and the Kurile language was both unwritten and 
apparently lacking in terms adequate to convey complex scientific or administrative matters 
(or at any rate the particular Kuriles on whom Golovnin was forced to rely did not know such 
terms), this process proved extremely frustrating and time-consuming.  Additional 
complications were caused by be necessity of avoiding certain common words that the 
interpreters did not know, and by the fact that foreigners were prohibited by law from 
learning the Japanese writing system.
33
  Preparing written documents was particularly 
onerous until the Russians managed to convince the Kurile-Japanese interpreter that word 
order could not be identical in Russian and Japanese.
34
  As, for example, unlike in Russian, 
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Japanese verbs normally come at the end of the sentence and the equivalent of prepositions 
routinely follow the words they govern, the difficulty of achieving this should not be 
underestimated.  Krusenstern notes a similar concern among Japanese officials for formal 
precision in written communication.  When Rezanov wished to present a report to the 
Japanese Emperor (Shogun), as well as a translation into Dutch the Nagasaki authorities 
required a copy of the Russian text ‘written with such accuracy that every line was to 
terminate with the same letter as the original’.
35
 
 A further difficulty with interpretation noted by Golovnin resulted from the fact that 
the political motivations of the Russians and the Kurile interpreters were not always identical.  
It happened, for example, that in the explanation of certain actions one of the interpreters 
chose to exculpate himself in the eyes of the Japanese by falsely accusing the Russians of 
anti-Japanese intentions.  It was therefore very difficult for Golovnin to know at first whether 
his words were being deliberately distorted.
36
  
 Except in one case which will be mentioned later, the purpose of Russian visits to 
Japan in the first half of the nineteenth century was pacific.  It was at the same time coercive 
in that the visitors would simply not accept that the wish of the Japanese government to close 
their country to Europeans was legitimate.  It is at the intersection of these two aspects of  the 
discourse of Russian exploration that the trope of  ‘anti-conquest’ becomes visible in the 
construction of the benignity of the European subject even as it strives to assert its authority 
and the superiority of European values.  To put the matter slightly differently, in the terms 
proposed by Syed Manzurul Islam, the narrative produced is to a greater or lesser extent 
‘sedentary’ travel writing in which the establishment of ‘a vantage point from which to carry 
out a representation of difference’ is of crucial importance.
37
 
 Not surprisingly it is in the two diplomatic missions that this strategy is most clearly 
apparent.  The Laxman permit carried by Rezanov no doubt gave Krusentern some 
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expectation that his 1804 mission would be favourably received.  Yet rather than treat the 
Japanese on terms of equality, his narrative persistently interprets difference as hostility.  He 
takes great exception, for example, to the Japanese style of formal salutation (touching one's 
head to the ground from a prone position) and especially to the compromise adopted by the 
Dutch, consisting of a right-angled bow held until permission was given to straighten up, 
which he describes as degrading.
38
  Krusenstern reads Japanese security measures, such as 
impounding the Russians’ gunpowder and firearms, and severely restricting their movements, 
both in Nagasaki harbour and on land, as insults, though in fact Rezanov was afforded a 
favour unprecedented even in European diplomacy, as Krusenstern himself acknowledges,  
when he was allowed to take an armed guard with him on shore.
39
  Bureaucratic delays 
caused by procedural inflexibility, complex divisions of responsibility and the necessity of 
referring decisions to the Shogun at Edo are also interpreted as deliberately obstructive.  
While complaining of the mistrustfulness he sees in Japanese behaviour, Krusenstern, like the 
other travellers, is quick to point out Japanese generosity in providing both provisions and 
materials for necessary ship repairs.  On the other hand, his narrative omits events which 
indicate Japanese tolerance and good will: for example, the episode related by Langsdorff, in 
which the Russians made a paper hot air balloon and inadvertently allowed it to drift 
dangerously over the land.
40
 
 Goncharov's double vision takes a particularly pervasive form.  He is an acute 
observer of the complex negotiations on matters of protocol designed to protect the dignity of 
both sides.  Where should meetings be held?  What refreshments should be offered?  Should 
chairs be provided for the Russians?  If so who should provide them?  Should the Russians 
remove their boots in Japanese interiors?  But perhaps because he was not himself a diplomat, 
Goncharov remains personally detached from any of these niceties and persistently asserts 
that beneath the effects of cultural difference the Japanese are identical to the Russians, or 
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nearly so.  He recognises, for example, a familiar type of an old man in the kindly and 
intelligent demeanour of  one of the envoys from Edo and acknowledges a standard of 
civilisation in the Japanese, to which, apart from a few details of manners and dress, 
Europeans could take no exception.
41
  In several lengthy digressions Goncharov shows 
himself quite sensitive to the political complexities underlying Japanese attitudes to the West, 
and in particular to the difficulty of achieving modernisation or change within the framework 
of the existing rigid constitutional system.
42
  Elsewhere, he is at pains to explain and justify 
certain Japanese cultural practices which may seem strange to the European eye – such as the 
custom of bowing from a kneeling position or removing one’s shoes on entering a building – 
in terms of the broader context of Japanese customs and social relations.
43
 
At the same time, however, there is a sense in which Goncharov treats Japan as not 
quite belonging to the real world.  Almost his first mention of the country is as ‘tridesiatoe 
gosudarstvo’, as a ‘far-off land’ in the expression used in Russian folklore to indicate a 
magical kingdom.
44
  Japan is called ‘a locked casket whose key is lost’.
45
  The Russians and 
the Japanese are the fox and the stork in Aesop’s fable, each unable to function within the 
other’s terms of reference.
46
  The Japanese officials are ‘porcelain dolls’, whose thinking 
cannot be penetrated; their behaviour is a ‘magical ballet’, ‘a scene taken from some fantastic 
ballet or opera’, which Goncharov is watching from the stalls of the Bolshoi Theatre in 
Moscow and in the reality of which he is unable to believe.
47
 
Goncharov treats Japanese behaviour with the devastating irony that he was 
accustomed to direct at other subjects in his fiction. True, Goncharov mocks Russian inability 
to cope with Japanese customs as well, but such comments as the following, on the imminent 
breakdown of the seclusion policy, show that irony can easily be implicated in political self-
interest.  To Goncharov the Japanese are like children: pursuing their seclusion policy they 
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have got out of their depth through their inexperience and lack of wisdom.  They must look 
now to European instructors to find a way out of their impasse: 
Like a playground intrigue, [the seclusion policy] has collapsed 
instantly with the appearance of the teacher.  [The Japanese] are alone, 
without help.  There is nothing for them to do but break out in tears 
and say ‘we are guilty, we are children’ and like children put 
themselves under the guidance of their elders.
48
 
A similar paternalism is indicated by Goncharov's reaction to the scenery of Nagasaki 
harbour.  He feels uncomfortable with what he sees as the unmediated presence of nature and 
wants to tame it by introducing all the attributes of nineteenth-century European civilisation: 
in my thoughts I covered all these hillocks and groves with temples, 
cottages, pavilions and statues, and the waters of the harbour with 
steamships and thickets of masts; I populated the shores with 
Europeans; I already saw paths of a park, galloping horsewomen, and 




He is offended that the Japanese do no know how to use Nagasaki properly.  If it 




 The reasoning behind Goncharov’s thinking here can be understood more clearly by 
reference to Fregata Pallada as a complete work, as a comparative interpretation of the 
peoples of the globe seen on a world tour.  In his travelogue as a whole Goncharov is ruled by 
a conception of progress and civilisation based firmly on European models and strongly 
linked with Christianity.  Goncharov consistently views the different nations which he 
encounters in terms of their ‘age’ on a scale of their development towards civilisation.  If the 
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English, with their highly developed industrial society and commercial instincts are 
indisputably ‘adult’, and the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands are seen as subsisting in 
‘childlike’ innocence, the Japanese occupy an intermediate stage.  While in many ways they 
are ‘children’, nevertheless the openness of many individuals to learning from the West 
suggests that they may in time emerge from their mental ‘torpor’ and, with suitable guidance, 
achieve equal maturity with Western nations.
51
 
 If Goncharov has been accused of presenting a superficial and often patronising 
account of the Japanese, Golovnin's work has been seen as a good deal more penetrating and 
serious.
52
  On occasion he admits to a natural impatience with the intrusive and apparently 
gratuitous questioning to which he is subjected, and he objects to the importunate requests 
made of the Russians for souvenir specimens of handwriting on fans.
53
  He is at the same 
time deeply impressed by the politeness of his Japanese captors and strives hard to understand 
their motivations and laws, even when these seem considerably at odds with European values 
and practices.
54
  Yet even Golovnin, for all his sympathy with the Japanese, is not entirely 
immune to the orientalism of his times, as can be seen from his actions before his capture.  
Proceeding circumspectly about his task of charting the southern Kurile islands, Golovnin 
landed on Iturup (Etorofu), disingenuously claiming that he expected to meet there only 
Kuriles, though he must surely have realised that the islands were under Japanese control.
55
  
After an interview with the local Japanese commander, Golovnin was given permission to 
proceed to the town of Urbich to replenish his supplies.  Golovnin notes that he deliberately 
concealed his true reason for being on Iturup on the grounds that the Japanese would not be 
able to understand it,
56
 and instead of going to Urbich as instructed turned south with the 
intention of surveying Kunashir and the strait between that island and Hokkaido.  Golovnin's 
arrest, even if there is some question of the extent to which it was officially sanctioned, 
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would seem a natural consequence of his flouting of Japanese laws regarding foreign 
shipping. 
 One particular feature of Golovnin's narrative is his exposure, as here, of his 
conscious deception of the Japanese on certain issues.  Thus, knowing that the Japanese had a 
great thirst for knowledge about the west and that they were liable to ask innumerable 
supplementary questions if given any information at all, he deliberately gave misleading 
answers on some topics and concealed the true content of a particular technical book in his 
possession to avoid possibly days of translation and explanation.
57
  He exaggerated the 
number of sailors under his command, and on several occasions he deliberately provided 
mistranslations of documents which he thought might prove prejudicial to the Russians' 
chance of release.  In particular, Golovnin was concerned to dissociate himself and the 
Russian government from the attacks made in 1807 on Japanese settlements on Iturup and 
Sakhalin by Nikolai Khvostov and Gavril Davydov.  These naval officers were acting under 
instructions from Rezanov, apparently in revenge for what he saw as the poor treatment he 
had received in 1804, and, although in fact they did not have the explicit support of St 
Petersburg at the time of the raids, they certainly did not turn out to be without friends in 
government circles after the event.
58
  It was important for Golovnin, however, to insist that 
Russia had only peaceful intentions towards Japan and that Khvostov and Davydov had acted 
in a private, not an official capacity.  In distorting the meaning of various papers Golovnin 
was of course acting in his own personal interests; he was also attempting to increase the 
likelihood of an eventual trading relationship with the Japanese.   
 The discourse of anti-conquest is by no means the only site for inscription of power 
relations or the negotiation of cultural difference which appears in the texts under 
consideration.  As should be clear from the above example they dwell also on relations 
between different Russian interest groups.  Somewhere behind Krusenstern's narrative lies the 
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history of a heated conflict between Rezanov and the officers of the ship on which he sailed 
concerning the nature of his command and the tenor of his instructions from the emperor.
59
  
Golovnin relates a confusion of cultural boundaries which took place in the mind of one of 
his junior officers as he broke down psychologically under the strain of imprisonment.  This 
officer, Fedor Mur, in direct defiance of Golovnin's orders, had been the first to make contact 
with the Japanese on Iturup.
60
  This rash action, which Golovnin at first put down to mere 
youthful impetuosity, was perhaps symptomatic of Mur's later mental instability.  When it 
became clear that the captured Russians were not to be released quickly or perhaps at all, and 
that part of the reason for this was anti-Russian feeling engendered by the raids of Khvostov 
and Davydov, Mur began to deny his Russianness, emphasising the German part of his 
ancestry, to inform on his fellow prisoners to the Japanese, and to adopt as far as possible 
Japanese manners and modes of dress.  Mur's behaviour, though apparently failing in fact to 
ingratiate him with the Japanese, severely complicated Golovnin's plan for escape.  Mur 
refused at first to participate, but then briefly changed his mind, before withdrawing from the 
plan and avoiding the company of the other Russians altogether.  Golovnin was then obliged 
to conceal all further preparations for the escape from him for fear he would betray the plan to 
the Japanese.  Mur seems to have become increasingly irrational as time went on, and 
particularly after it became clear that the Russians were finally to be released, to the extent 
that he began deliberately to make false or misleading statements to the Japanese calculated 
to compromise the Russians’ position.  After his return to the Russian mainland in early 
November 1813, Mur obsessively expressed his remorse for his behaviour, shunned the 
society of his fellow officers and lived chiefly with the native inhabitants of Kamchatka, 





At one point in his memoir, in an uncharacteristically self-conscious aside, Golovnin 
remarks that a novelist could only with difficulty imagine the unlikely sequence of events in 
which the Russians had been involved.  The only element missing, he claims, is the 
opportunity for one of the officers to win the affections of a distinguished Japanese lady who 
would help them to escape.
62
  If anything, however, Golovnin underplays the romantic and 
the exotic in his account of Japan, choosing not to pass on and possibly embroider the stories 
of others, but to confine himself to his ‘own observation and experience’.
63
  Like 
Krusenstern’s, Golovnin’s narrative belongs to an established category of travel writing by 
military or naval officers, which was read at the time as much for its plain accounts of 
everyday life in remote parts of the world as for either its sensationalism or its social 
analysis.
64
  In their concern to set down an authentic record of both events and geographical 
information which would be useful to future expeditions, both Golovnin and Krusenstern 
follow the pattern of the official ship’s log; personal or reflective comments, while they are 
certainly present, are given a distinctly subordinate role.  
The situation with Goncharov is quite different.  As an established man of letters, he 
was much more deeply aware of questions of literary affiliation and prepared to manipulate or 
challenge them.  In choosing to present his material not as a simple memoir, but in the 
ostensible form variously of letters to his friends in Russia and of a personal diary, for 
example, Goncharov immediately aligns himself with the well established epistolary tradition 
in literature.   It has been noted, too, that Fregat Pallada, with its constant denial of the 
exotic, contains a parody of the sentimental, Karamzinian style of travel writing.
65
  Certainly, 
Goncharov’s juxtaposition of descriptive narrative and personal reflection, historical 
explanation and political speculation; his particular combination of comedy and moral 
seriousness, all suggest that on one level he is responding to Karamzin.
66
  At the same time, 
as suggested above, Fregat Pallada promotes Goncharov's own particular aesthetic and 
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ideological perspective, whether this is seen as fundamentally realist or, as Henrietta Mondry 




 Detailed discussion of the generic peculiarities of Russian travel writing is outside the 
scope of this paper, but in conclusion it is worth noting one discourse that is conspicuous by 
its absence from the early nineteenth-century accounts of Japan which have been under 
discussion.  This is the construction of Japan as an aestheticised object which was 
popularised in the later nineteenth century by Pierre Loti and Lafcadio Hearn, reinforced by 
the vogue for japonisme in art, and also reflected in later Russian travel writing on Japan.68  
In this vision everything about Japan is small, delicate and elegant, doll-like and above all not 
to be taken seriously.  In particular, femininity became the prime focus of the exotic gaze. 
This perspective is perhaps foreshadowed in Goncharov's use of the term ‘ballet’ to describe 
the elaborate ceremonial of Japanese diplomatic hospitality, and in his characterisation of the 
Japanese as ‘children’, but it is altogether missing from Krusenstern and Golovnin.  Part of 
the reason for this is no doubt that none of the Russian explorers gained any real knowledge 
or experience of Japanese art or music or literature.  Neither did they come into contact to any 
extent with Japanese women, certainly not with women of the cultivated classes.  The official 
world which the Russians encountered was exclusively male.  Aside from some general 
comments about Japanese dress, Krusenstern does not mention women at all, though 
Langsdorff notes that there were many women among the sightseers watching the foreign 
ships enter and leave Nagasaki harbour, and comments unfavourably on the practice among 
married women of blackening their teeth.
69
  Golovnin also includes a few incidental 
references to women seen in the distance, and notes that after the Russians’ escape and 
recapture some of the women in the villages through which they passed shed tears of 
sympathy for the captives.
70
  Those few women observed by Goncharov, he characterises, in 
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contradiction to later established opinion, as very unattractive, again referring to their 
blackened teeth.
71
  It was only later, once European economic influence in Japan had been 
firmly established and more sustained interaction with all levels of Japanese society was 
possible, that aestheticisation became a dominant interpretation.  By then of course the power 
relationship had changed; Russia was no longer a supplicant at Japan's door but was seeking 
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